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APPENDIX
REPORT ON ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
OF JOINT INDUSTRY ACTIVITIES UNDER
PRICE CONTROLS*
Pursuant to the authority of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,'
the nation has recently experienced "Phase IV" of a program of price con-
trols. This statutory authority expired on April 30, 1974, except as to certain
petroleum products.
2
Phase IV, to a greater extent than the preceding three phases of controls,
gave rise to a need and an opportunity for joint industry efforts to influence
and guide governmental authorities in shaping pricing policies in the econ-
omy. This report, therefore, examines the legal basis for such joint industry
activities within the purview of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. If authority
is granted by Congress for any extension of controls, this report may be
of use to antitrust practitioners in assessing the future conduct of their clients;
absent such extension, it is hoped that this report will have historical value
through documentation of some of the problems and considerations involved
in the relationship between government price controls and antitrust laws.
Historical Perspective of Price Controls
Prior to implementation of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, the
federal government had initiated economic control programs during four
separate periods in this century: World War I, the Depression, World War
II, and the Korean War. As part of each of these controls programs, compet-
ing members of various industries found themselves required by regulation
or necessity to engage in activities which normally ranged from being "ques-
tionable" under the Sherman Act to being what today would constitute
*This Report has been prepared by a special subcommittee of the Sherman Act Committee,
consisting of William W. Sadd, editor, and William E. Huth, John C. Cortesio, Jr., and Howard
0. Hunter. It was prepared as a study project and is published solely for its educational value
and interest to the antitrust bar. It does not purport to state the views of the Section of
Antitrust Law (or of its Sherman Act Committee) or the views of the American Bar Association.
'Act of August 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §1904 (1973).
'rhe Federal Energy Administration continues to control certain petroleum products pursuant
to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 628 (1973); 15 U.S.C. §§751-786
(1975); see also FEA Ruling 1975-2, 40 Fed. Reg. 10655-60 (March 7, 1975), and Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Win. E. Simon, (C.D. Calif. Civ. No. 73-2091-WMB), with regard to the relationship
between price controls and the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970) as to competitive
discounts.
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per se violations. A review of the history of these four periods of control
raises a warning flag as the nation moves back to a free market economy:
(i) a program of cooperation and exchange of information among competi-
tors once established by government encouragement can have a tendency
to continue when the crisis for which the program was established ends;
and (ii) the government will not hesitate to attack any such programs which
are so continued. As a prelude to a consideration of the current problems
of antitrust law as it relates to the economic stabilization program, it is
useful to examine briefly the four prior controls periods.
Shortly after the United States entered World War I the federal govern-
ment created the War Industries Board in 1917 to establish a cooperative
effort between the federal government and private industry which was to
function principally through industry trade associations. Bernard M. Baruch,
who was instrumental in the establishment of the War Industries Board,
described this cooperative effort as follows:
In line with the principle of united action and cooperation, hundreds of
trades were organized for the first time into national associations, each
responsible in a real sense for its multitude of component companies and
they were organized on the suggestion and under the supervision of the
Government. Practices looking to efficiency in production, price control,
conservation, control in quantity of production, etc., were inaugurated
everywhere. Many business men have experienced during the war, for the
first time in their careers, the tremendous advantage both to themselves
and to the general public of combination, of cooperation and common
action with their natural competitors.
3
However, the intent of the antitrust laws was to limit such cooperative
efforts among competitors, and a number of trade associations and their
members found themselves under attack in the 1920's by the same govern-
ment that had blessed them for cooperative efforts in 1917 and 1918.
The efforts of the Justice Department resulted in four major Supreme
Court decisions in the 1920's which established the general parameters for
trade association activities and contacts among competitors which continue
to prevail. The first two decisions, in the cases of American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States4 and United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.,5 involved
classic "open competition" plans. Manufacturers in the respective industries
exchanged information through their trade association on production, de-
mand, supply, past and future prices, expansion plans, market trends, cus-
tomers, and all manner of other pertinent business data. The members of
the association held regular meetings to discuss market areas, production,
demand and prices.
3B. BARUCH, AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR (1921), as quoted in FTC, OPEN-PRIcE TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS, S. Doc. No. 226, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1929).
4257 U.S. 377 (1921).
5262 U.S. 371 (1923).
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The Supreme Court in both the Hardwood and the Linseed Oil cases was
sweeping in its condemnation of the "open competition" programs and the
Justice Department was spurred to bring a host of cases against trade associa-
tions, many of which led to the termination of "open competition" programs
through consent decrees.6 The next two major Supreme Court decisions
limited the impact of the Hardwood and Linseed Oil cases.
The Justice Department brought actions against the Cement Manufac-
turers Protective Association and the Maple Flooring Manufacturers Associ-
ation in which it argued that the information exchange programs in those
industries necessarily resulted in "uniformity of prices and limitation of
production." 7 The Supreme Court rejected the government's arguments in
both Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States8 and Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States.9 The effect of the Court's opinions was that trade
associations would be allowed to collect and to disseminate information
on costs, production, prices and similar matters provided that the informa-
tion was not identified by company, that it related only to past transactions,
and that it was also made available to customers of the association's members
and to others with whom such members had business dealings.
Some eleven years later the Supreme Court reaffirmed the general princi-
ples of its Maple Flooring and Cement Manufacturers decisions in Sugar Institute
v. United States. '0,11
The history of government controls programs and their relationship to
government enforcement of the antitrust laws during the Depression, World
War II, and the Korean War reflects the general history of the World War
I program and its aftermaths. The overall purpose of each instance was
to stabilize various sectors of the economy and to insure the proper allocation
of materials and the proper production of goods to meet the specific necessities
of the moment. The needs of the Depression period and the needs of World
'See generaty G. LAMB & C. SHIELDS, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 9 (rev. ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as LAMB & SHIELDS]; and see, e.g., United States v. Atlanta Terra
Cotta Co., indictment returned Sept. 28, 1921, S.D.N.Y., guilty pleas by some entered Dec.
15, 1921, nolle prosequi entered as to others, Nov. 20, i923 and Aug. 29, 1927; United States
v. Hiram Norcross, petition filed Oct. 25, 1921, W.D. Mo., decree dissolving the combination,
April 2, 1924, modified, Feb. 14, 1927; United States v. Mid-West Cement Credit & Statistical
Bureau, petition filed Oct. 1921, N.D. Ill., dismissed Jan. 21, 1926; United States v. Central
Foundry Co., indictment returned Dec. 28, 1921, S.D.N.Y., nolle prosequi entered Aug. 10, 1925;
United States v. Tile Mfrs. Credit Ass'n, petition filed Feb. 14, 1922, S.D.N.Y., consent decree
dissolving the combination entered the same day, modfied, May 1, 1924 and Nov. 23, 1927;
United States v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Corp., petition filed Mar. 20, 1922, S.D.N.Y., consent
decree entered same day, dissolving the association.
7Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 592 (1925).
81d
9 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
1°Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
"Set also, cases collected at 2 TRADE REG. REP. 4730 re exchange of information, and
particularly see United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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War II and the Korean War were quite different, but the general method
adopted by the government in each instance was centered around industrial
cooperation programs subject to the overall control of the government.
The most far reaching of these programs in its theoretical scope was the
National Industrial Recovery Act,'12 which was enacted in 1933. It designated
trade associations as agents to draft Codes of Fair Competition for their
various industries. Trade groups were established for those industries which
did not have active associations. Although the NIRA, by its terms, did not
modify or amend the Sherman Act, it did exempt from the impact of the
antitrust laws any action which was in compliance with an approved Code
of Fair Competition.13 These Codes, as approved by the National Recovery
Administration for various industries, established limitations on production,
set prices, required retail price maintenance, prohibited secret pricing meth-
ods, sought to prohibit price cutting, required cost, production and price
disclosures, and required compliance with a host of other regulations some
of which were permissible and some of which were patently illegal under
the antitrust laws. A violation of an approved code was a misdemeanor
14
and an unfair trade practice under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.
15
The Supreme Court in 1935 held in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States
16
that the NRA involved an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authori-
ty and the NIRA was terminated in June of that year. A number of trade
associations and industries were left with Codes that contained unprotected
antitrust violations. Some associations were disbanded, others rid themselves
of activities that were questionable under the antitrust laws, and others
just kept on with their programs. 17 Not surprisingly, this resulted in lawsuits.
The landmark case arising out of the NRA period was United States v, Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co.'s
The extent to which trade association activities continued which were
in violation of the antitrust laws is shown by the statistics on cases brought
by the Justice Department. Between 1939 and 1943 the Justice Department
brought 72 criminal actions and 58 civil actions against trade associations
and their members. Only seven of the criminal actions went to trial and
in four of those the defendants were found guilty. Only one of the civil
actions actually went to trial, and the government won it. The rest were
settled by means short of trial.
12Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
"id. §5(a).
141d. §3(o.
"5Id. §3(b).
16295 U.S. 495 (1935).
17LAMB & SHIELDS at 15.
18310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 authorized organizations some-
what akin to a trade association but more closely tied to the government
and known as "industry advisory committees." These committees were de-
signed to provide a source of statistical information and an analysis of.
business needs to particular industries in order to facilitate government price
regulation and allocation programs.
The price and wage controls established during World War II lasted for
a longer period of time and were more comprehensive in their scope than
any system of government economic regulation before or since. The controls
system, as such, does not appear to have given rise to antitrust litigation
which was as clearly an outgrowth of the system as did the activities of
the War Industries Board and of the NRA. Nevertheless, there were some
652 industry advisory committees formed during the Second World War
and in conjunction with the OPA they set up detailed regulations and
elaborate pricing formulas for their various industries.
During the Korean War, an Office of Price Stabilization was created
by statute in 1950,19 and controls were established over allocations of ma-
terials, production capacity, prices, and wages. Again the government relied
on business advisory committees, but this time it was made clear that the
advisory committees were to do nothing more than advise the OPS. The
Act did require the OPS to consult with the industry representatives before
issuing regulations unless such consultation was impractical or impossible
for security reasons. In order to minimize subsequent difficulties with the
antitrust laws, the Justice Department formulated stringent standards to
be followed by industry advisory committees and the Korean War economic
controls program did not produce the antitrust problems of earlier programs.
Controls Under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970
In sharp contrast to the prior control systems, for the first time under
Phases I-IV, the government did not rely on private industrial advisory
or rate setting boards in administering prices.20 Further, unlike earlier con-
trols, and-the usual regulated industry rate-making practice, the Government
did not fix specific industry-wide prices for specific commodities or services,
nor, except for energy, did it try to regulate production or supply. Current
price controls have been on a company-by-company basis and have been
primarily confined to (1) establishing and regulating profit margins with
reference to a specific base period and (2) substantially limiting price in-
creases to actual net cost increases.
i"Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 798, 50 U.S.C. App. §§2061-2166 (1951).
20Address by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Walker B. Comegys, Jr., Phase In, Phase
Out, before Wage and Price Control Institute, New York City, Nov. 29, 1971 [hereinafter cited
as Comegys Address].
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The following is a' brief description of federal price and wage controls
during Phases II-IV as set forth in President Nixon's 1974 Economic Report
to Congress: 21
A somewhat more detailed review of the policies and major regulatory
requirements of Phases I-IV is provided in an Appendix accompanying
this report, entitled "Phase I To Phase IV-A Look At Price Controls."
Due to the fact that under Phases I-IV, specific prices for commodities
were not established on an industry-wide basis but rather were controlled
indirectly, on a company-by-company basis, through regulation of profit
margins and price increases, the whole scheme of control resulted in different
ceiling prices and profit margins applicable to individual companies. These
differences created a variety of possible dislocations or problems within dif-
ferent industries depending particularly on the spread of profitability. Price
controls, in some instances, tended to aggravate existing industry imbalances
in this area. Firms with a higher level of profitability, for example, were
allowed to retain that level. This feature was potentially most oppressive
competitively in industries where the market leader enjoyed the highest
profitability.22 Controls on profit margins also tended to favor firms with
the greatest prospects for sales growth, an increase in which became a poten-
tial means of increasing profits notwithstanding the applicable profit mar-
gins. Such regulation penalized efficiencies, whether brought about through
reduced costs, vertical integration or otherwise, where such cost reductions
caused profit margins to exceed the allowable base period margins.
Further, since price controls did not apply to export sales by domestic
companies, the firms with the better developed foreign sales operations had
a potential advantage. In addition there was an incentive for domestic manu-
facturers to do more exporting to overseas markets where there were no
price controls.
While the Antitrust Division has allocated a considerable part of its overall
budget to intervening in regulatory proceedings, there is no record that
it reviewed the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to the Economic
Stabilization Program for their potential anticompetitive effects or recom-
mended changes intended not to impair existing market structures. On the
other hand, price regulation has been influenced by factors unrelated to
competition or inflation. 23
2 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS 91 (1974).
22The Cost of Living Council, as did the Price Commission, provided a means by which
a firm with a loss or low profit history could potentially acquire an applicable profit margin
that could be higher than that otherwise permitted by the regulations. Cost of Living Council
(Phase IV) Regs. § 105.201-202.
2 3Grayson, Let's Get Back to the Competitive Market System, 51 HARV. Bus. REV 103.107 (1973).
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The Cost of Living Council.-Joint and Individual Presentations
Officials of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice indicated
very early in the Economic Stabilization Program that the Antitrust Division
was at least suspicious of concerted industry activity in respect to the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Program. 24 Discernment of this attitude by industry
may have acted as a deterrent to joint industry activity in the area of the
Economic Stabilization Program. However, it must be emphasized that joint
industry presentations were not practical in many instances due to the neces-
sity of an individual company approach to compliance with the Economic
Stabilization Program.
Nonetheless, in many instances the Cost of Living Council appears to
have acted on an industry-wide basis, or to have cooperated with industry
groups such as trade associations. Perhaps one of the best examples was
in the Council's exercise of its authority to promulgate regulations. When
the Council first issued its proposed Phase IV regulations, interested persons
were invited to submit written data, views, or arguments. 25 Subsequent
thereto, it was reported that the Council received approximately 671 formal
comments on the proposed regulations, some of which were submitted by
trade associations. 26
This same procedure of inviting public, and in effect industry, comment
on proposed rules and regulations was also followed by the Council on
November 7, 1973, when proposed rules on health care were promulgated
27
and again when proposed rules modifying the petroleum regulations were
issued,28 and in other instances. 29
Decontrol, or the granting of at least partial exemptions from the Econom-
ic Stabilization Program, constitute another area where the Cost of Living
Council acted on an industry-wide basis. By illustration, on January 30,
1974, the Council exempted many petrochemical feedstocks from Phase IV
price regulations, and eliminated cost justification requirements, yet retained
profit margin constraints for other petrochemical products. 30 A multitude
of other exemptions were granted. 31
Some of the early exemptions granted by the Council appear to be the
direct result of activities of trade associations or other concerted industry
24Comegys Address.
2538 Fed. Reg. 19464 (1973).
2 6CCH ECONOMIC CONTROLS, Report Letter, Aug. 14, 1973.
2738 Fed. Reg. 30850 (1973).
2 8Cost of Living Council Release No. 464, Nov. 16, 1973.
29See 38 Fed. Reg. 32628.
30Cost of Living Council Release No. 512, Jan. 30, 1974.
32 See Cost of Living Council News Release of April 1, 1974.
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action. 32 Others appear to have resulted from separate negotiations by indi-
vidual members of an industry with the Council. 33
An interesting example is the well-publicized conditional exemption from
wage and price controls of the automobile, truck and bus manufacturing
operations of four major companies. 34 This conditional exemption was grant-
ed by the Council in return for individual company commitments (one com-
pany made no commitment) to limit their price increases for the rest of
the model year.35 However, in this instance, the commitments given by the
companies were in the form of a pledge not to raise prices on certain au-
tomobiles by more than $100.00 or $150.00, depending on the company
and vehicle involved, notwithstanding the fact that prenotification of price
increases had previously been filed by the companies for increases that, on
the average, were above those subsequently agreed upon.36
The exemption granted the cement industry is a good example of the
Council working With individual companies and with the industry as a
whole. In the announcement, John Dunlop, Director of the Cost of Living
Council, stated that " . . . on the basis of communications with individual
companies.. .;' it was anticipated that prices would remain essentially stable
during the first half of 1974.37 However, the Release also stated that the
Portland Cement Association would inform the Council on a regular basis
of individual company plans for capital expenditures and net additions to
capacity in the industry.
38
Areas for Joint Industry Activiy
Industry-wide meetings or presentations on the subject of future pricing
levels have not been practical or necessary because of the structure of the
regulatory sMheme aid its focus on profit margin levels and cost pass through.
However, a brief inspection of the industry exemption or partial exemption
announcements that the Council issued under Phase IV, citing economic
reasons or justifications for their decisions, and an examination of the Eco-
32See CCH ECONOMIC CONTROLs-Stabilization Program Guidelines 41,161. The First
Amendment protects the right to advocate, either individually or through an association, and
also the association's right to engage in advocacy on behalf of its members. Local 1954 Fed.
of Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corp., 457 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1972).
33CCH ECONOMIC CoNTROLS-Stabilization Program Guidelines, 41,161.
34These firms were not exempted from compliance with the Cost of Living Council's regula-
tions concerning executive and variable compensation. Cost of Living Council Release No.
482, Dec. 10, 1973.
3 5Cost of Living Council Release No. 482, Dec. 10, 1973.
361d
3 7Cost of Living Council Release No. 472, Nov. 27, 1973.
38ld
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nomic Stabilization Program in general, reveal a number of categories of
possible joint industry activities. Some of these areas are:
(1) A meeting of industry leaders, initiated by the Council, to discuss
collection of industry statistics which were not otherwise available but were
essential to the administration of the price control law.
(2) An industry-wide political effort to abolish or modify price controls
over the industry through legislative action, involving a combination of
lobbying efforts and promotional campaigns.
(3) Industry intervention in pricing proceedings applicable to supplier
companies to better assure that its own raw material costs were satisfactorily
controlled.
(4) An industry recommendation to the Council of common accounting
procedures to assure an equitable appraisal of each company's costs and
profits within the industry.
(5) An industry application or petition for an exemption from price con-
trols under Phase IV. A White House Press Release dated July 18, 1973,
specified that one objective of Phase IV controls included "procedures to
consider decontrol industry by industry. '39
(6) An industry effort to modify regulations in an effort to insure that
it was at least possible for an industry to comply with regulations promulgat-
ed in their final form. Such an effort might have involved educating the
Council as to the pricing structure or methods of operation within such
industry.
The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 directs in Section 207 that proce-
dures be available to any person to seek interpretation, modification, rescis-
sion, exception or exemption from rules, regulations and orders, and also
provides for formal hearings. In this respect it appears that Act itself antici-
pated some industry-wide comments on proposed regulations and requests
for exemption.
The antitrust implication inherent in all the above-listed activities comes
from their basic intent to affect in some way the pricing mechanism in
the particular industry affected. Each of the activities, if successful, could
result in an effect upon price levels within the industry. The clearest example
of this point would be a successful petition for an exemption from price
controls where in the very act of petitioning, industry officials almost neces-
sarily convey to each other a desire or even intent to raise prices upon
decontrol. Any one of the listed activities could require the discussion or
exchange of price or cost information which under any other circumstances
3White House Press Release, July 18, 1973, CCH ECONOMiC CONTROLS, 49,003.
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would not take place within a particular industry.40 However, this is not
to say that any of the activities of necessity involve any violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act. In short, these activities offer a vehicle or opportunity
for combination or conspiracy and the possibility of an effect upon price
levels resulting thereform. The key question therefore is the extent to which
such activities must be protected under First Amendment rights to respond
to or influence governmental action.
The View of the Antitrust Enforcement Agencies
The Antitrust Division appears to be suspicious of any joint industry
action in the price control area, especially in regard to the establishment
of any price ceilings.
41
At the beginning of the price control program one Antitrust Division
representative concluded broadly that in view of the Price Commission's
early decision not to approve a joint industry presentation for a price increase,
•.. there seems to be little excuse for private, concerted action of competitors
on price issues. There would now seem to be absolutely no justification
for meetings of competitors to devise a collective pitch to Price Commis-
sion.42
Of course it must be again emphasized that this statement was made early
in the Economic Stabilization Program, well before the Cost of Living Coun-
cil adopted a policy of inviting public comment on proposed regulations,
and well before the policy of granting a least partial industry exemptions
was liberalized.
While the Department has not pointed to any overriding antitrust prohibi-
tion against all joint industry contacts with government regulators, it may
have discouraged many such contacts by advising regulatory departments
and commissions of the Executive Branch in what the Division admits to
be non-legal areas. With the rising apprehension of government regulators
in dealing with companies on an industry-wide basis, there is less room
for industry associations and- other groups to act in this area.
In general, the antitrust division's approach is that trade associations and
other industry groups should not interfere with an area of great public
interest.43 The Department's position was specifically described recently by
an official of the Antitrust Division:
Finally, while this is not exclusively an antitrust problem, we also encour-
age the agencies as a general rule to proceed to gather information on
4°See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
4 1Comegys Address.
42 1d
4
'Clearwaters, Trade Associations and the Antitrust Laws-A View from the Justice Department,
18 ANTm-RusT BULL. 233, 239-40 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Clearwaters].
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a company-by-company basis. This minimizes the risks that competitively
sensitive information will be exchanged, and it permits the agency to test
the submission of one firm against another. At times in the past, govern-
ment agencies, seeking to determine the feasibility of a particular federal
action were told by trade associations that what the government sought
to do could not be done or could be done only at great expense. With
a united industry front, the government has no way of testing such asser-
tions. By proceeding on a company-by-company basis, we may come upon
one firm which not only believes that the proposed action is feasible for
the industry, and will not pose unusual financial hardships, it may have
developed the means of getting the job done.44
Assistant Attorney General Thomas Kauper in a letter to the new Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission, restated the policy as it applies to tech-
nical know-how:
The third course of action contemplated would involve joint industry pre-
sentations of technical information and advice to the Bureau to assist the
Bureau in developing mandatory safety standards. Neither the antitrust
laws nor the outstanding decree prevent the match manufacturers from
consulting with a government agency for the purpose of assisting the latter
to develop safety standards. The Department believes, however, that the
Bureau when attempting to determine the present state of the art or the
technical feasibility of a standard should discuss such matters with the
manufacturers on an individual basis rather than with the industry as
a whole. By acting in this manner the Bureau might find that, by consider-
ing a variety of viewpoints, it can develop its mandatory standards from
a broader data-base. 45
Certain exceptions have been carved out of the Antitrust Division's usual
position on joint presentations. These exceptions are best illustrated by the
"Smog" consent decree since this decree involved a most important public
issue and represents the genesis of the Division's policy. The Division agreed
to certain joint industry presentations to government regulatory agencies.
The consent decree specifically authorized:
Joint statements relating to (i) the authority of the agency involved, (ii)
the draftsmanship of or the scientific need for standards or regulations,
(iii) test procedures or test data relevant to standards or regulations, or
(iv) the general engineering requirements of standards or regulations based
upon publicly available information; provided that no joint statement shall
be filed which discusses the ability of one or more defendants to comply
with a particular standard or regulation or to do so by a particular time,
in the absence of a written agency authorization for such a joint statement,
and provided also that any defendant joining in a joint statement shall
also file a statement individually upon written request by the agency in-
volved.46
44,Id.
45Letter from Assistant Attorney General Kauper to Bureau of Product Safety, Mar. 28,
1973, 5 TRADE REG. REP. V 50,182.
46United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 1969 Trade Cas. N72,907 at 87,458 (C.D. Cal.
1969).
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Congress also has indicated certain areas where it believes that it is appro-
priate for regulatory agencies to work with industry associations. The legisla-
tive history of the new Consumer Product Safety Act indicates an intent
that industry participate in the development of safety standards.4 7 Similarly,.
under the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, the Department of Commerce
has the responsibility to seek industry cooperation in reducing the number
of packages for a product where it has determined there is an undue prolifer-
ation of same.
48
The Federal Trade Commission, which is an independent agency and
does not function as the legal advisor to government regulatory commissions
and departments, has not taken so firm a position on joint industry-govern-
ment communications. 49 It generally has confined itself to the problem of
industry self-regulation.
The Constitutional Issue
One might argue that if competing companies may not themselves agree
on maximum prices under the Sherman Act, 50 the same end may not be
lawfully attained by petitioning the government to do it for them. It could
also be argued that short of actually agreeing on price levels, joint activities
of the types described above could have a "necessary effect" which is the
equivalent of a price agreement. 51 Such conclusions, however, cannot be
reached without taking into account the First Amendment right which per-
sons have jointly to ask the government to adopt any law or regulation
that serves their common interests, or to repeal regulations and laws, includ-
47CCH CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY GUIDE 150. But see Clearwaters.
48TRADE RaG. REP. No. 382 (Dec. 8, 1968).
49Dietrich, The Role ofAntitrust During Phase II, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 419-22 (1972) In Rodgers
v. FTC, 492 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974), the FTC considered a combination among
competing grocery chains and certain suppliers to engage in a publicity campaign directed
at the public for the purpose of defeating an item on the ballot in an impending election.
The ballot item, if passed, would have imposed additional packaging and handling costs on
these companies. The companies apparently jointly threatened price increases on the related
goods if the ballot item were passed. The combined effort was an indirect approach to the
legislature. The Ninth Circuit determined that the decision in Eastern Railraod Presidents Conf.
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (see text infra), was controlling. Significantly,
the FTC, in a letter to the plaintiff dated January 26, 1971, indicated a rather broad interpreta-
tion of Noerr. The letter stated in part:
Even assuming a wrongful motive, for purposes of consideration of your complaint,
and the willful use of distortion or deception, it is our view that actionable violation
of Section 5 of the FTC Act is not indicated due to the overriding public interest
in preservation of uninhibited communication in connection with political activity,
particularly in connection with legislative processes. Nor would illegality attach
because joint action may have been here undertaken on the premise of economic
advantage, not merely political interest.
S°United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
51Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
APPENDIX
ing antitrust laws, which do not serve their interests. 52 The right to petition
the government is of equal dignity with the rights of free speech and press.
As stated in Thomas v. Collins:53
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech
and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these,
though not identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights ...and
therefore are united in the First Article's assurance.
Further, under Phases I-IV it was the government alone which regulated
prices, and no one has successfully maintained that such regulation has
been beyond the scope of government power, even though price competition
is adversely affected, if not eliminated, in the process. This is lawful. 54 It is
unlike the situation in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. 55 There, railroads them-
selves were authorized under the Interstate Commerce Act to establish just
and reasonable rates, fares, charges and classifications. The Court held that
the defendant companies had gone beyond this point. It stated:
It is sufficient here to note that we find no warrant in the Interstate
Commerce Act and the Sherman Act for saying that the authority to fix
joint through rates clothes with legality a conspiracy to discriminate
against a State or a region, to use coercion in the fixing of rates, or to
put in the hands of a combination of carriers a veto power over rates
proposed by a single carrier. The type of regulation which Congress chose
did not eliminate the emphasis on competition and individual freedom
of action in rate making.
56
The case illustrates the potential Sherman Act risks companies encounter
in attempting to deal with government price regulation on an industry basis.
The case led to enactment of a statutory exemption over the subject matter.57
This risk is heightened with the type of price regulation used in Phases
I-IV. For example, the Cost of Living Council was concerned with
maximum prices, leaving companies free to charge lower prices. If an in-
dustry association proposed a particular ceiling price to the Council (perhaps
pursuant to a request for exemption from the Economic Stabilization Pro-
gram) which the Council adopted, and all of the industry members thereafter
increased their prices up to that level (a most logical thing to do economi-
cally), there is still a risk of an argument that the companies tacitly agreed
to so raise their prices within the ceiling set by government action.
52United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
-323 U.S. 516 (1945).
'See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943, Wainwright v. National Dairy Prods. Corp.,
304 F. Supp. 567 (N.I.) Ga. 1969).
55324 U.S. 439 (1945).
5Id at 458-59.
5749 U.S.C. §b(a) (1970).
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The fact that the industry association's records of agendae and minutes
of the meetings at which the association's proposals to the Council were
formulated and agreed upon contain no evidence of any agreement to raise
prices and, indeed, contain actual declarations against any such agreement,
might not be sufficient to successfully rebut the inference of wrongdoing.
Such companies would then be confronted with the traditional problem
of attempting to rebut such an inference through evidence of industry-wide
cost increases and the absence of abnormally high industry profits.
5 8
This difficulty, and the related expenses involved, must have persuaded
some companies not to assume the risk of jointly proposing price levels.
The risk level seems considerably lower, however, for such subject areas
as proposed changes in the existing law or regulations and proposals for
exemptions or decontrol, as they would normally have a somewhat remote
relationship to actual pricing. The activities described in Items 1 through
6 set forth above would often seem to fit into such a risk-level category.
In this connection, there is some question whether immunity is obtained
simply because regulatory officials are present during joint industry delibera-
tions, whether or not at their invitation.59
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
Apart from the defense that no agreement in fact was ever entered into,
expressly or tacitly, the types of joint activities discussed above should be
protected under the First Amendment as communications reasonably neces-
sary to the exercise of consitutional rights. In Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc.,60 the United States Supreme Court held that a
railroad association's efforts to influence the passage and enforcement of
state legislation harmful to truckers who competed with the railroads were
exempt from the Sherman Act, even though deception, misrepresentations,
and unethical tactics were utilized and the sole purpose was to destroy the
truckers as competitors for the long-distance freight business. The Court
stated that "[t]he Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons
from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the
executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce
a restraint or a monopoly."61
The Noerr Court discerned an essential dissimilarity between an agreement
jointly to seek legislation or law enforcement and the agreements traditional-
-"Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
59Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D. D.C. 1973), modified
and aft'd sub noa. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3636 (June 2, 1975).
-°3 6 5 U.S. 127 (1961).
6
'Ia at 136.
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ly condemned by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court felt that the
question of inapplicability of the Sherman Act was conclusively settled when
this factor was considered along with other difficulties that would be present-
ed by a holding that the Act forbids associations for the purpose of influenc-
ing the passage or enforcement of laws and observed:
In the first place, such a holding Would substantially impair the power
of government to take actions through its legislature and executive that
operate to restrain trade. In a representative democracy such as this, these
branches of government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large
extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of
the people to make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold
that the government retains the power to act in this representative capacity
and yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the
government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose
to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a purpose which
Would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act. Second-
ly, and of at least equal significance, such a construction of the
Sherman Act would raise important constitutional questions. The right of
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we can-
not, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these
freedoms .....
Th6 right of the people to inform their representatives in government of
their desires with respect to the passage .or enforcement of laws cannot
properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing so. It is neither
unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that
they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage
to their competitors .... 62
Four years after the Noerr decision, in UMW ,v. Pennington,63 the Court's
attention was focused upon an alleged effort by large coal mine operators
and union officials to eliminate small companies by seeking to persuade
the Secretary of Labor to set higher minimum wage standards for companies
selling coal to the TVA on long-term c6ntracts. The Court in Pennington
stated even more explicitly:
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws
even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal,
either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of
the Sherman Act.6
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine was reiterated and, in certain respects, broad-
ened by the Court in California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,65
621d. at 137-38, 139.
63381 U.S. 657 (1965).
64Id. at 670.
5404 US. 508 (1972).
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decided in 1972. There the claim was that a group of trucking companies
conspired to resist and defeat before state and federal regulatory commissions
all applications by their plaintiff competitors for the issuance, transfer or
registration of operating rights. Most importantly, the Court expressly ex-
tended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to administrative agencies and to the
courts. The Court stated that "[c]ertainly the right to petition extends to
all departments of the Government."'66 It was stated by the Court that "it
would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that
groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws,
use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts
to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their
business and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors. '67
There are certain exceptions, however, to the basic doctrine of the Noerr-
Pennington-Trucking Unlimited trilogy. The Supreme Court in Noerr pointed
out that there might be instances where what appear to be bona fide attempts
to influence governmental action are a "mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business rela-
tionships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would
be justified." 68
Subsequently the Supreme Court in Trucking Unlimited held that alleged
abuses of the judicial and administrative processes were actionable as within
the "sham" exception to Noerr. The Court there observed that the complaint
relied upon the sham theory, alleging that the power, strategy, and resources
of the defendants were used to harass and deter the plaintiffs in their use
of administrative and judicial proceedings so as to deny them "free and
unlimited access" to those tribunals, with the results that the machinery
of the agencies and the courts was effectively closed to the plaintiffs and
that the defendants had become the "regulators of the grants of rights,
transfers, and registrations to plaintiffs." '69 The Court viewed the allegations
as being that defendants sought to bar their competitors from meaningful
access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp the decisionmaking process,
not that the conspirators had sought "to influence public officials. '7° The
Court pointed up the distinction between the "political" campaign in Noerr
and a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims which would constitute abuse
of administrative and judicial processes, effectively barring parties from
access to the agencies and the courts and thereby producing an illegal result.
66d. at 510.
6 d at 510-11.
68365 U.S. at 144.
69404 U.S. at 511.70 d. at 511-12.
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The Court declared, "Insofar as the administrative or judicial processes are
involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge
under the umbrella of 'political expression.' -71
Exceptions to the doctrine have also emerged or been recognized with
respect to commerical dealings between government and industry and, per-
haps ancillary to or as part of the "sham" exception, as to all forms of
"illegal and reprehensible practice which may corrupt the administrative
or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust violations", 72 such
as misrepresentations, perjury, fraud, coercion or bribery. Certain of these
exceptions find recognition in the first decision by the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc73 (purely commercial dealings); Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters
Local 15074 (threats, intimidation, and other coercive measures against public
officials); and Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America75
(submission of false reports).
In the case of George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., supra,
decided by the First Circuit in 1970, the court elucidated the distinction
between the so-called Parker v. Brown76 immunity and the Noerr-Pennington
immunity. The court characterized these two doctrines as separate but relat-
ed principles of antitrust exemption and summarized Paddock's reliance
upon them as follows:
First, drawing on Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341. Paddock argues that
restraints of trade which. result from valid governmental action cannot give rise
71Id. at 513. Possible application of the "sham" exception has also been recognized in the
context of resistance to an air carrier's petition for subsidy before the Civil Aeronautics Board
which allegedly was made with the predatory intent and purpose of eliminating plaintiff as
a competitor. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Haw.
1972), aftd, 489 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 991 (1974). Similarly, recognition
has been given to possible application of the "sham" exception in the context of an alleged
conspiracy to keep a drug product off the market by the alleged influencing of the Food and
Drug Administration to deny fair consideration of new drug applications filed by plaintiffs.
Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,512,513 (1972). Howev-
er, the presence of malice in using the government processes is not an exception to the Noery
doctrine, since it merely goes to the intent of those who utilize those processes. See Sierra
Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1972). This matter of intention, of course,
is to be distinguished from fraud, coercion, perjury, misrepresentations, and the like.
73424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); on remand, trial resulted in judgment
for the defendants. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 376 F. Supp.
125 (D. Mass.), afid, 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied 43 U.S.L. W. 3636 (U.S. June
2, 1975). The immunity question, having been disposed of in the first Court of Appeals decision,
was not in issue in the appeal from the judgment entered after trial.
14440 F2d 1096 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
'5438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
6317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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to private antitrust liability. Second, relying primarily on Eastern Railroad
Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, supra, and United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington, ..., Paddock maintains that joint
efforts to influence public officials are beyond the scope of the antitrust laws.
(Emphasis added.) 77
For purposes of the appeal from the trial court's summary judgment dismiss-
ing the complaint, the Court of Appeals assumed that the defendant Paddock
had combined with architects and others to write the specifications for pipe-
less swimming pools bought by public bodies in a way that would exclude
competitors. The Court concluded that the Parker v. Brown immunity did
not apply, and observed that if the suit had been brought by certain school
boards rather than a competitor, it would be anomalous to dismiss the
school boards' suit on the grounds that, by adopting Paddock's specifications,
they had conferred immunity on monopolistic practices which they had
never considered, which they lacked the authority to approve, and which
undermined the entire process of competitive bidding.
In analyzing the Noerr-Pennington immunity, the Paddock Pool court con-
strued the scope of the immunity within a rather narrow dimension. The
court's analysis read into the Noerr doctrine a requirement that a significant
policy determination be involved. The court stated that it felt the key to
the Noerr decision was the Supreme Court's heavy emphasis on the political
nature of the railroads' activities and its repeated reference to the "passage
or enforcment of laws." The Paddock Pool court declared:
But the efforts of an industry leader to impose his product specifications
by guile, falsity, and threats on a harried architect hired by a local school
board hardly rise to the dignity of an effort to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws. By 'enforcement of laws' we understand some signifi-
cant policy determination in the application of a statute, not a technical
decision about the best kind of weld to use in a swimming pool gutter.
Noerr alone, then, does not support Paddock's position. 78
Continuing its focus on Noerr's stress of the importance of free access to
public officials vested with a significant policy-making discretion, the court
in Paddock Pool stated that it doubted "whether the [Supreme] Court, without
expressing additional rationale, would have extended the Noerr umbrella
to public officials engaged in purely commercial dealings when the case
turned on other issues."' 79 The Appeals Court in Paddock Pool also pointed
out that the First Amendment does not provide the same degree of protection
to purely commercial activities as it does to matters of political persuasion.
17424 F.2d at 29.
78Id at 32.
79Id at 33.
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The United States Supreme Court decision in Trucking Unlimited, which
was issued subsequent to the Paddock Pool decision, tends to erode Paddock
Pool's emphasis on joint efforts toward influencing significant policy determi-
nations as a sine qua non to application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Trucking Unlimited establishes that the Noerr-Pennington philosophy governs
the approach of citizens or groups of citizens to administrative agencies
and to courts and that the right to petition extends to all departments of
the government. Fundamental to this judicial antitrust exemption is whether
the governmental mechanism involved provides adequate safeguards such
as hearing and appeal rights. While it may be doubtful that the court in Paddock
Pool would have characterized judicial and agency determinations as signifi-
cant policy determinations in the application of a statute or application
of significant policymaking discretion; nonetheless, to the extent that Paddock
Pool holds the Noerr-Pennington doctrine inapplicable in the context of com-
mercial dealings with the government, it seems to be grounded upon firm
footings.
Persons contemplating the use of cooperative efforts or joint presentations
before governmental agencies are advised to keep in mind the parameters
of the Noerr-Pennington-Trucking Unlimited doctrine. The antitrust immunity
conferred only covers joint efforts to influence the governmental body whose
resulting action may operate to impose restraints upon trade or commerce.
The mantle of immunity does not in any other respect cloak or protect
any contract, combination, or conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade
or commerce. The joint efforts to influence the public officials may be im-
mune, even if "part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman
Act", 80 but this does not render the "broader" portion of the scheme immune.
To the extent such a scheme extends beyond such joint efforts to influence
public officials, such scheme and its results will fall under antitrust sanctions.
Thus, for example, cooperative efforts toward joint presentations before
price regulating authorities will not immunize companies from antitrust
liability if in the course, or as a result, of such cooperative efforts, they
engage in price-fixing or other schemes tampering with the price mechanism,
market division, or agreements to limit production. The following words
of an official of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice serve
as a warning of temptations which may attend such joint efforts:
Our nation's prior experiences with price controls most clearly demonstrate
that meetings of competitors to present a common front in governmental
decision making have tended to degenerate into agreements to restrict
production, raise prices or retard innovations. Firms might exchange sensi-
8
°UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
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tive information on costs, customers and suppliers with their competitors.
This, of course, can have a dampening effect on competition ....
During Phase II, we are also concerned that firms, acting in the name
of compliance with price controls, will independently exchange price infor-
mation ....
Unless otherwise authorized by the Price Commission, joint discussions
involving prices, changes in product lines and sensitive cost data should
be absolutely avoided.
For trade associations, I think it is perfectly clear that the safest course
is 'business as usual.' Associations are well advised to adhere to standards
of antitrust compliance established prior to Phases I and II ....
I think that competitors engaging in otherwise unlawful joint activity will
find little protection in the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, which exempts certain
joint activities from the antitrust laws. (Emphasis added.)81
Another danger to be avoided in addition to that of engaging in illegal
combinations or conspiracies in connection with lawful joint presentations
would be the use of joint presentations to price regulating authorities as
a sham device to accomplish some anticompetitive design. For instance,
the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington-Trucking Unlimited doctrine would
apply to any industry group that would attempt to exclude any industry
member from access to the price regulating authority through use of govern-
mental processes. Further, any resort in presentations to price regulating
authorities to illegal or reprehensible practices, such as misrepresentation,
perjury, fraud, coercion, or bribery, or other activities which tend to corrupt
or abuse the administrative, executive, or judicial processes, will fall outside
the purview of the Noerr immunity.
As has been indicated above in this Report, some areas are far more
appropriate than others for joint presentations to price regulating authorities.
For instance, such matters as the ceiling prices for particular entities are
items which can only be properly resolved on an individual, one-by-one,
company-by-company approach. One could reasonably assume that meet-
ings of competitors for joint efforts by them or on their behalf where such
items are concerned would be particularly suspect. And, whatever the eco-
nomic-controls subject-matter area of combined efforts of competitors, and
irrespective of their success before the pricc regulating authorities, there is
serious danger that their cooperation, if followed by subsequent parallel
pricing or other parallel activity in the competitive context, will provide
circumstantial evidence that the joint efforts were productive of concerted
actions in addition to those involved in simply making a joint presentation
to the price regulating authorities.
StComegys Address.
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Accordingly, in assessing the desirability of launching joint presentations
to price regulating or other governmental officials, careful consideration
must be given not only to the legality of the anticipated joint effort itself,
but also to whether concerted activity is appropriate to the type of objective
sought and whether pricing or other activities which may ensue in the
competitive context, when coupled with the cooperative effort, will generate
circumstantial evidence of antitrust violations separate and apart from the
concerted approach to the price regulating authority.
Conclusion
Based on the above, it is reasonable to conclude that in most instances
concerted industry efforts to obtain government action or inaction under
Phases II-IV would in themselves be protected from the antitrust laws. This
is not to say, of course, that simultaneous purely commercial activities would
be immunized or that concurrent unlawful concerted action that bears a
companion or ancillary relationship to the protected activities would escape
antitrust sanction, for quite the contrary is true. And the antitrust counselor
must be vigilant for possible circumstances which would warrant application
of Noerr's sham exception or one of the possible varieties or hybrids thereof
as refined by subsequent decisions. In all events, this is an area where compe-
tent legal analysis must be applied in a case-by-case approach, based on
a thorough review of relevant information.
The initial general conclusion set forth above, however, should not be
disturbed by the fact that regulatory decisions may arise out of government
conferences with industry groups. A conference is supposed to result in some
solution and a solution can hardly materialize without some understanding
between industry members and the government. Further, such conferences
may fail unless preceded and followed by discussion among the companies
regulated which is reasonably related to compliance with such regulation.
While it may be impossible to achieve complete harmony between the
regulators, the regulated, and the Antitrust Division in this area, the prospect
of fostering a more efficient government and improved government-industry
relations would seem to commend increased accommodation of First Amend-
ment guaranties in the Antitrust Division's philosophy as to joint industry
presentations.
Finally, the obvious fact must be stated that joint activities protected
during the existence of price controls lose that protection when the controls
end. History demonstrates that cooperative attitudes among competitors
engendered during periods of control may be difficult to eradicate in the
post-control period. Vigilance by the antitrust counselor is necessary to avoid
an aftermath of litigation.
PHASE I TO PHASE IV-A LOOK AT PRICE CONTROLS
[This appendix was prepared during Phase IV which expired April 30, 1974]
Temporary Freeze I-August 15, 1971
"The time has come for decisive action-action that will break the vicious
circle of spiraling prices and costs."1
With this statement, President Nixon proceeded to unveil his plan for
a freeze on all prices and wages throughout the U.S. for a period of 90
days.
Along with this freeze, a Cost of Living Council (CLC) was set up within
the Government. This Council was to work with leaders of labor and business
to set up the proper mechanism for achieving continued price and wage
stability after the 90-day freeze.
Nixon emphasized two characteristics of his action. "First, it is temporary.
To put the strong vigorous American economy into a permanent straitjacket
would lock in unfairness . . . and second, while the wage-price freeze will
be backed by Government sanctions, if necessary, it will not be accompanied
by the establishment of a huge price-control bureaucracy." 2
Phase II-November 13, 1971
"I am announcing tonight (October 7, 1971) that when the 90-day freeze
is over on November 13, we shall continue our program of wage and price
restraint."3
The following steps were taken in attempting to achieve the Administra-
tion goal of a 2.5% ceiling on price increases for the economy as a whole.
(A figure arrived at by the following calculations: The maximum wage
increase was set at 5.5%. Since productivity increased for the whole economy
at approximately 3% yearly, businesses would only have to raise prices 2.5%
(5.5-3.Q) in order to cover increased wage costs.)
A Price Commission and a Pay Board, both to be backed up by the
CLC, were established to set the guidelines in their respective sectors of
the economy. They were to seek voluntary cooperation with business and
labor; however, both were backed by the authority of law to make their
t Address by President Nixon, A New Economic Policy, 37 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 675
(1971).
21d at 675.
3Address by President Nixon, The Economic Plan, 38 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 3 (1971).
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decisions binding. Violations of their guidelines could result in civil or crimi-
nal penalties.
4
The focus of the government regulators was going to be on big business.
Companies were classified into three categories:
1) Price Category I firms: Generally, firms with annual sales or revenues
in excess of $100 million-these firms had to prenotify the Price Commis-
sion of most price increases and had to receive at least tacit approval of
the increases from the Commission.5
2) Price Category II firms: Generally, firms with annual sales or revenues
between $50-$100 million-these firms could raise prices without prior
Price Commission approval, but had to file quarterly reports concerning
prices, costs and profits.
6
3) Price Category III firms: Generally, a firm with annual sales or revenues
of less than $50 million-not subject to prenotification or reporting but
subject to monitoring or spot checks. 7
A company that contemplated charging a price in excess of the base price
had to consider the following factors:
1) Manufacturers, using the date of their last price increase, or January
1, 1971 (whichever was later) had to determine the amount of increases
in "allowable cost".8 "Allowable cost" was defined as any cost not disal-
lowed by the Price Commission.9 Any resulting price increase had to be
reduced to reflect productivity gains, and could not result in an increase
in the firm's applicable profit margin."0
2) Retailers and wholesalers were permitted to charge a price in excess
of the base price whenever the customary initial percentage markup after
November 13, 1971, with respect to the property sold, -was equal to or
less than the last customary initial percentage markup before November
14, 1971, or, at the option of the company, its customary initial percentage
markup during its last fiscal year ending before August 15, 1971. Any
price increase was only permissible to the extent that it did not result
in an increase in the firm's applicable profit margin."i
3) Alternatively, a Price Category I firm might decide to use the Term
Limit Pricing option, whereby firms agreed to limit their overall weighted
4Economic Stabilization Act Amendments 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 748.
5Cost of Living Council (Phase II) Regs., 6 C.F.R. § 101.11, superseded 6 C.F.R. § 130 (1974);
Price Commission Regs., 6 C.F.R. §300.5 1, superseded 6 C.F.R. § 130 (1974).
'Cost of Living Council (Phase II) Regs., 6 C.F.R. §101.13, superseded 6 C.F.R. §130 (1974);
Price Commission Regs., 6 C.F.R. §300.52, superseded 6 C.F.R. § 130 (1974).
7Cost of Living Council (Phase II) Regs., 6 C.F.R. § 101.15, superseded 6 C.F.R. § 130 (1974).
'Price Commission Regs., 6 C.F.R. §300.12, superseded 6 C.F.R. §130 (1974).
9Price Commission Regs., 6 C.F.R. §300.5, superseded 6 C.F.R. §130 (1974).
15 Price Commission Regs., 6 C.F.R. §300.12, superseded 6 C.F.R. §130 (1974).
"Price Commission Regs., 6 C.F.R. §300.13, superseded 6 C.F.R. §130 (1974).
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average price increases over base prices to 2 percent or less, per fiscal
quarter, for a one year period.
12
Profits were also subject to limitations:
Using the weighted average of the best two of the three fiscal years ending
before August 15, 1971, a firm determined its "base period" profit margin.
During Phase II, if a firm raised any price above the base price, it could
not exceed this applicable profit margin unless such firm "purified" itself
(a procedure which involved rescinding price increases above base price
levels and remitting to customers the revenues derived in the fiscal year
from charging prices in excess of base prices.)
The administration hoped that by limiting profits, firms would respond
by increasing productivity, increasing sales volume, and reducing costs.
President Nixon also asked Congress for a one-year extension of the Stabili-
zation Act of 1970. This is the Act which is the President's source of power
to control the economy.
Phase Ill-January 11, 1973
"After reviewing the results of . . . the experience gained from operating
the present system, it is clear that the burdens of a control system will
mount in the coming period if the present system continues for long un-
changed in an expanding economy. '"13
In what was to be the first step toward restoring a free market economy,
President Nixon replaced the strict controls of Phase II with the more flexible,
self-administered controls of Phase III.
The Pay Board and Price Commission were terminated, and the manage-
ment of Phase III was to be handled by the Cost of Living Council. The
Government still retained the authority to set rules controlling future con-
duct where it appeared that voluntary conduct was inconsistent with the
goals of the pr6gram. To this end, the President again asked for a one-year
extension of the Economic Stabilization Act.
Prenotification and reporting requirements were relaxed under Phase III.
Prenotification was only required of manufacturing and service organiza-
tions with annual sales or revenues in excess of $250 million, and then only
if the weighted average of price increases exceeded 1.5%." However, all
12CCH ECONOMIC CONTROLS, Phase II Rules 1231.
3New Shape of Controls-The Official Outline, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, January 22, 1973,
at 58.
4Cost of Living Council (Phase III) Regs., 6 C.F.R. § 130.130 (1974).
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firms with annual sales or revenues in excess of $250 million were required
to file quarterly reports of profit margin and price changes.' 5
The definition of the "base period" for purposes of profit margin calcula-
tions was expanded to, in effect, include any fiscal year ending on or about
August 15, 1971.16 A firm was also permitted to raise prices to reflect in-
creased cost, without regard to its applicable profit margin, if its average
price increases would not exceed 1.5% in a year.17 These changes gave com-
panies more flexibility in regard to pricing.
In four special areas (food, health, construction, interest and dividends),
the Government was not yet ready to allow self-administered enforcement,
and government regulation was maintained at a higher level."8
However, price behavior did not prove to be satisfactory under Phase
III.
Phase III 1/2-June 13, 1973
On June 13, 1973, President Nixon brought the Economic Stabilization
Program in full turn by promulgating Executive Order No. 11723, which
froze prices at the level charged during the first eight days of 1973. This
second freeze was essentially a reinstitution of the Phase I 90-day freeze,
except that its duration was only for 60 days, and it applied only to prices.
Wages and dividends and interest continued to be subject to the Phase
III rules and regulations.
One of the purposes of this new freeze was to provide time for development
of a fresh approach-Phase IV of the Economic Stabilization Program.
Phase IV-August 12, 1973
In July of 1973 the Cost of Living Council issued regulations and proposed
regulations for Phase IV, which eventually became effective for most busi-
nesses on August 12, 1973. These new regulations were stated to have result-
ed, at least in part, from extensive consultations by members of the Cost
I'Cost of Living Council (Phase III) Regs., 6 C.F.R. §130.21 (1974).
"
6 Cost of Living Council (Phase III) Regs., 6 C.F.R. §130.110 (1974).
17Cost of Living Council (Phase III) Regs., 6 C.F.R. § 130.13 (1974).
18See Cost of Living Council (Phase III) Regulations, Part 130, Subparts F, G, & H, CCH
Economic Controls-Stabilization Program Guidelines V31, 405.
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of Living Council staff with consumers, businessmen, farmers, Congressional
leaders, and government officials. 19
Phase IV marked a return to more mandatory, stringent controls. Some
of its key features included a sector by sector approach, with controls tailored
around particular economic conditions of each sector, and a reportedly more
flexible exceptions policy to permit relief in cases of hardship or to permit
necessary supply increases. 20
Prenotification and reporting requirements are similar to Phase II. Many
firms with annual sales or revenues exceeding $100 million must give 30
days' advance notice of price increases. Approval may thereafter be assumed
unless the Cost of Living Council suspends, denies or cuts back the preno-
tified increases.21 All firms with annual sales or revenues exceeding $50
million must file quarterly reports with the Cost of Living Council. 22
Business certainly was given very little new leeway within which to raise
prices. Subpart E of the Cost of Living Council Regulations applies to
manufacturing and service activities, and permits a company to charge any
price which does not exceed the higher of the "adjusted freeze price" or
the "base price". Essentially, the "adjusted freeze price" is the maximum
charge permitted during the 60-day prior freeze, and the "base price" is
the average price at which an item was priced during the last fiscal quarter
which ended before January 11, 1973. Prices can only be increased to cover,
on a dollar for dollar basis, net increases in allowable costs incurred sub-
sequent to the last fiscal quarter which ended before January 11, 1973.
As before, all proposed price increases must be reduced to reflect productivity
gains.
Retailers and wholesalers were controlled by Subpart K of the Cost of
Living Council Regulations. Very generally, these regulations provided that
a retailer or wholesaler must control his prices so that for any fiscal quarter
his "customary initial percentage markup" or "gross margin" for each mer-
chandise category does not exceed the higher of (1) his customary initial
percentage markup or gross margin for each merchandise category during
19 "Fact Sheet-Economic Stabilization Program-Phase IV," issued by the Office of the
White House Press Secretary, July 18, 1973; Phase IV Regulations and Questions and Answers,
Cost of Living Council Publication S-3066 (8-73) 41.
20
"Fact Sheet-Economic Stabilization Program-Phase IV," issued by the Office of the
White House Press Secretary, July 18, 1973.
21Cost of Living Council (Phase IV) Regs., 6 C.F.R. §150.151-155 (1974).
22Cost of Living Council (Phase IV) Regs., 6 C.F.R. § 150.161 (1974).
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the same quarter of the base period or (2) his base period customary initial
percentage markup or gross margin. Additionally, the customary initial per-
centage markup or gross margin for any fiscal year may not exceed the
base period customary initial percentage markup or gross margin.
Generally speaking, the profit margin limitations imposed during Phase
IV were the same as those contained in the regulations promulgated pursuant
to Phase III.
Phase IV controls were supposed to provide more flexibility than the
Phase II "across-the-board" rules. Decontrol of the economy would be in-
dustry by industry. Methods of "indirect" government control of inflation
were being investigated and used. For example, certain import quotas were
raised, and export limitations tightened in order to increase supply. Phase
IV is to expire on April 30, 1974.
In the final stages of Phase IV, the Cost of Living Council is primarily
using negotiated agreements with business as an economic control. The
threat of being subject to more stringent Congressional controls, after the
Economic Stabilization Act expires April 30, 1974, has led many industries
to cooperate in committing to price constraints beyond April 30, 1974, and
up to the end of the calendar year.
For example, the cement industry, by agreeing to keep cement prices stable
through June 1974, boosting output and capacity, and reporting prices to
Washington, will be exempt from controls until June 30, 1974.
In conducting the negotiations, CLC Director John T. Dunlop says he
is looking for:
1) Price restraints by companies, for as long as six months.
2) Pledges of production increases, if possible, through startup or marginal
or discontinued operations, as well as commitments for capital expansion,
with regular reports on capital expansion filed with the CLC.
3) Business and labor actions designed to improve industrial relations.
4) Better industry statistics, with greater disclosure of information in order
to monitor agreements as well as improve the overall government data
base for economic analysis.
There is discussion by Mr. Dunlop that all of these procedures would
be continued in a Phase V. However, it is not expected that the Council
will have any authority to roll back prices, order refunds, or impose fines;
this could be done only by Congressional action on a case by case basis. 23
23Dunlop Works Some Phase V Deals, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 16, 1974, at 47.
